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Children who are victims of family abduction are uprooted from their
homes and deprived of their other parent. Often they are told the other
parent no longer loves them or is dead. Too often abducted children live a
life of deception, sometimes under a false name, moving frequently and
lacking the stability needed for healthy, emotional development'
I. INTRODUCTION
I BECAME A FATHER for the first time a little more than one
year ago. The day of my daughter's birth was one of the hap-
piest days, if not the happiest day, of my life. The minute Lauren
entered the world, my life changed forever. She has brought me
immeasurable joy-and, yes, perhaps just a tiny touch of occa-
sional frustration-in the months since she was born. It is diffi-
cult to express the feeling I had the first time I held her,
trembling from fear I would drop her; the first time she smiled;
the first time she smiled at me; the first time she laughed; pretty
much every other time she's laughed. I could go on, but I think
you get the picture, and for those readers with children, you
have experienced this yourselves. I cannot wait to enjoy every
moment I can with my daughter as she grows up, and I cannot
imagine my life without her.
For the parents whose children are abducted, however, a life
without a child is exactly what they must endure. And with in-
creasing frequency, children are being abducted by one of their
parents.2
According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office report,
the State Department reported that between 2007 and 2009, it
received 3,011 requests for assistance in effecting the return of
4,365 parentally-abducted children to the United States from
other countries.' The number of these requests increased every
year between 2000 and 2009, from 405 in 2000 to 1,135 in 2009.4
Studies estimate the number of international parental abduc-
tions of American children is anywhere from 1,000 to 10,000 per
year.5
I THE NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, FAMILY ABDUCTION: PRE-
VENTION AND RESPONSE, at vii (6th ed. 2009).
2 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-602, COMMERCIAL AVIATION:
PROGRAM AIMED AT HIGH-RISK PARENT ABDUCTORS COULD AID IN PREVENTING AB-
DUCTIONS 1 (June 2011) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL AVIATION].
3 Id.
4 Id. at 3-4.
5 Michael R. Walshand & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction and the
Hague Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 29-30 (2006).
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The reasons for the increase in international child abductions
include advances in international transportation, increased free-
dom to travel across borders, an increase in the number of mar-
riages between people of different countries, and an increase in
the number of divorces.'
From 1998 to the present, there have been five court cases
involving claims by left-behind parents against air carriers al-
leged to have transported the abducting parent and child(ren).
The obvious question is: If there have only been five cases involv-
ing parental child abduction over the past sixteen years, why is
this an issue with which air carriers should be concerned? The
answer is straight forward: According to the State Department,
approximately 64% of abductions are to non-border countries,
almost all of which likely are accomplished by international
flight.7
* As the number of abductions goes up each year, logic dic-
tates that so too would the number of abductions accom-
plished through international flight.
* These abductions have very serious effects on both the
children and the parents of children who have been
abducted.'
* The potential recoveries are therefore quite substantial, as
is evidenced by the cases that have reached a verdict.'
6 See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. McELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INT'L CHILD ABDUCTION (P.B. Carter ed., 1999).
7 COMMERCIAL AVIATION, supra note 2, at 5.
8 Id. at 4 ("Research shows that recovered children often experience a range of
problems, including anxiety, eating problems, nightmares, mood swings, sleep
disturbances, and aggressive behavior. Parents whose children have been ab-
ducted may encounter substantial psychological, emotional, and financial
problems in fighting for the return of their children."); Noah L. Browne, Rele-
vance and Fairness: Protecting the Rights of Domestic-Violence Victims and Left-Behind
Fathers Under the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 60 DUKE L.J.
1193, 1198-99 (Feb. 2011) ("Abducting children uproots them from familiar sur-
roundings, puts them at risk of serious emotional and psychological problems,
and strains or even breaks their bonds with their left-behind parents. The effects
of abduction, unfortunately, outlive the abduction itself; even if returned, many
abducted children continue to have significant emotional and physical problems.
The left-behind parents of abducted children similarly suffer emotional stress
and turmoil, which can continue long after the children are returned.").
9 See Streeter v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., No. X01020179481S, 2005 WL 4357633,
at *9, *22 (Conn. Nov. 10, 2005) (denying defendant's motion to set aside verdict
and for new trial or remittitur, and upholding a $27 million dollar judgment
against charter carrier arising out of abduction of plaintiff-mother's two children
by their natural father); Pittman v. Grayson, No. 93 CIV. 3974 JSM, 1997 WL
370331, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.July 2, 1997), aff'd, 149 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (setting
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In light of the increasing number of abductions and the
stakes involved, it can be expected that these types of cases will
arise with greater frequency in the years to come. This is espe-
cially so if an airline is hit with a substantial verdict, which, in
the information age, will garner a great deal of adverse publicity.
Four of the five parental child abduction cases against air car-
riers ultimately resulted in judgments for the airline defendant,
with the one exception involving a charter operator, not an air-
line. The basis for the four dismissals varied because courts have
been inconsistent in their application of relevant law. As a re-
sult, carriers have reason to be concerned because liability in
these cases likely will depend on the particular facts underlying
the action and, perhaps more importantly, on the court in
which the action is brought.
This article reviews these five cases and analyzes the issues
raised by parental child abduction by air. It then explores the
two most robust defenses carriers have to these actions: (1) pre-
emption under the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) and (2) pre-
emption under the Warsaw/Montreal Convention. Ultimately,
this article concludes that state law claims arising out of parental
child abduction should be preempted by the ADA in all cases
and also by the pertinent Convention in cases involving interna-
tional transportation by air.
II. THE CASES
The five aviation-related parental child abduction cases to
date focused on the following issues: (1) whether the claims
were preempted by the ADA; (2) whether the claims were gov-
erned or preempted by the Warsaw/Montreal Convention;10
and (3) whether the plaintiff could establish his or her entitle-
ment to recovery under state law if the claims were not pre-
aside a $15 million dollar verdict against Icelandair for compensatory and puni-
tive damages arising out of abduction of plaintiff's daughter to Iceland); see also
Bower v. El-Nady, 962 F. Supp. 2d 368, 372 (D. Mass. 2013) (after a default judg-
ment was entered, the court awarded Bower, the parent left behind, in excess of
$40 million in damages against the abducting ex-wife).
10 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention]; Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Inter-
national Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13038, 2242 U.N.T.S. (entered
into force Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. The Warsaw and
Montreal Conventions preclude recovery for mental injuries not caused by physi-
cal injuries. See Warsaw Convention, supra; Montreal Convention, supra.
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empted. While the decisions have not been uniform, they
provide guidance for properly handling future claims.
A. PTTMAN v. GRAYSON
The first case to address parental child abduction in the avia-
tion context was Pittman v. Grayson, which arose out of the ab-
duction of Elizabeth Pittman (Elizabeth) by her mother, Erna
Pittman Grayson (Erna)." Erna, in contravention of court or-
ders preventing her from removing either child from Northwest
Florida, took Elizabeth and her daughter from a second mar-
riage to Iceland."
The evidence established that an Icelandair official named El-
lerup allowed the children to travel, despite the fact that the
names on the tickets did not match the names on the passports,
and he made false entries in the weight and balance codes to
conceal the fact that Erna's party consisted of a woman and two
children." Moreover, Erna's second husband (Grayson), con-
tacted two of Icelandair's offices by phone to voice his fears that
Erna, in violation of court orders, intended to travel with the
children."
Elizabeth's father, Frederick Pittman (Frederick) sued Ice-
landair, Erna, Erna's boyfriend, and Erna's stepfather asserting
claims of intentional interference with parental custody, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and
negligence. 5 The individual defendants failed to appear, and,
after removal to federal court, the case proceeded against
Icelandair.16
Prior to trial, Icelandair filed a motion to dismiss, which was
denied." In denying the motion to dismiss, the district court
found that (1) Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, which sets
forth the fora in which an action governed by the Convention
may be brought, did not apply because there was no Article 17
"accident," thus freeing the plaintiffs to pursue their state law
11 Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 116-17; see also Pittman v. Grayson, 1997 WL 370331, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
July 2, 1997).
14 Pittman, 149 F.3d at 115.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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claims;' 8 and (2) the ADA did not preempt plaintiffs claims be-
cause allowing plaintiffs' suit to proceed "would not frustrate
the ADA's economic deregulation of the airlines nor would it
significantly impact the Airline's competitive posture," and "the
ADA is not intended to be a safe harbor for airlines from civil
prosecution for the civil analogues of criminal offenses."" The
subsequent motion for summary judgment was denied without
discussion on the basis that there were disputed issues of mate-
rial fact.2 0
Despite motions for judgment as a matter of law during the
presentation of plaintiffs' case and after the presentation of all
evidence, the court submitted the case to the jury on the claims
of interference with parental custody, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and false imprisonment.2 '
The jury found Icelandair liable and returned a verdict of $15
million. 2 2 The district court, however, then granted Icelandair's
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that
despite the evidence that Icelandair had knowingly assisted Erna
in surreptitiously leaving the country, there was insufficient evi-
dence to "establish that Ellerup was aware that Erna's conduct
violated Frederick's custody rights or a court order."2
The appeals court held that because "Icelandair, as a com-
mon carrier, had a duty to transport anyone who sought passage
and was not free to refuse to transport Erna and the girls simply
because" it had been informed of the court order, the district
court erroneously charged the jury that liability could be predi-
18 Pittman, 869 F. Supp. at 1069-71. The court's analysis of the Warsaw Conven-
tion has been overruled, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 177 (1999) that the Convention exclusively
governs all actions within its scope and preempts all state law claims. Moreover, as
the parties agreed that the action arose out of "international transportation"
under Article 1(2) of the Convention, the court did not make an independent
finding that the claims fell within the Convention's scope. Id. at 1068-69.
19 Id. at 1074.
20 Pittman v. Grayson, No. 93 CIV 3974 (AGS), 1996 WL 164476, at *1-3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996).
. 21 Pittman v. Grayson, 149 F.3d 111, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998) (effectively dis-
missing the negligence cause of action by refusing to give the jury an instruction
on it).
22 Id. at 117.
23 Id. at 117-18 (hinging its determination on the lack of evidence that Ellerup
was aware of the phone calls and the possibility that Ellerup believed Erna was
fleeing an abusive relationship, not abducting her children).
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cated on a finding that Icelandair had notice of the court order
prohibiting Erna from transporting Elizabeth.
The plaintiffs appealed, but the only issues before the Second
Circuit were whether the evidence was sufficient to establish a
claim for interference with parental custody (i.e., "that Ice-
landair aided and abetted or conspired with Erna in interfering
with parental custody") and whether the negligence cause of ac-
tion should have been submitted to the jury.25 The Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's judgment on the interference
claim on the basis that the airline was not given adequate notice
that Erna's travel to Iceland with Elizabeth violated a court or-
der.26 The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's deci-
sion on the negligence claim. 27 It held Icelandair did not owe
any duty to Frederick, a member of the general public.2 1 Moreo-
ver, while it owed a duty to Elizabeth, there is "no authority for
the proposition that a common carrier has a duty-either gener-
ally or based on oral representations-to ensure that a minor
traveling with a custodial parent is not being transported in vio-
lation of a court order."2 While Icelandair avoided liability, the
Second Circuit's decision left the door open for liability in an-
other case with stronger evidence of notice to the carrier.
B. STREETER v. EXECUTIE JET MANAGEMENT, INC.
The next parental child abduction case arose out of the ab-
duction of Cornelia Streeter's (Streeter) two minor children to
Cairo, Egypt, by Anwar Wissa, Jr. (Wissa), the childrens' father
and Streeter's ex-husband.so At the time of the abduction,
Streeter and Wissa shared legal custody under valid and enforce-
able court orders, with Streeter having primary physical cus-
tody.3 1 The flight to Cairo was operated by Executive Jet
Management (Executive Jet), a private charter company, and
24 Id. (explaining the district court's reasoning).
25 Id. at 118-19, 124.
26 Id. at 123 (focusing on Grayson's failure to (1) contact Icelandair's New
York offices where Icelandair's senior officials were located; (2) ask to speak with
a high-ranking officer; (3) contact Icelandair in writing; or (4) provide Icelandair
with copies of the court orders restricting Erna's right to travel with her
daughters).
27 See id. at 124.
28 See id. at 125.
29 Id. at 125.
so Streeter v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., No. X01020179481S, 2005 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 3702, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005).
s1 Id.
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was arranged with less than thirty hours notice for $160,000.32
The fee was paid from the personal account of an individual
with no apparent connection to Wissa after Wissa's attempt to
pay with a corporate credit card did not cover the full amount."
Executive Jet's Director of Charter Operations could not recall
any instance where a flight was booked on such short notice, for
such a high fee, or by one parent traveling with children and
without the other parent.34
Executive Jet filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
basis that plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by the War-
saw Convention." The court dismissed the minor plaintiffs'
state law claims, finding they were governed and preempted by
the Warsaw Convention. 6 The court concluded, however, that
the Warsaw Convention did not govern the mother's claims."
Executive Jet also filed a motion for summary judgment,
which was denied. Of relevance to the denial of summaryjudg-
ment was the court's analysis of whether Executive Jet owed and
breached any legal duty to Streeter (i.e., whether it was negli-
gent) . The court acknowledged the Second Circuit's holding
in Pittman that the carrier owed no duty of care to the non-trav-
eling father,40 but it focused instead on the fact that the harm to
plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Executive
32 Id. at *1, *14.
3 Id. at *14-15.
34 Id. at *14. There was also evidence that Executive Jet violated the charter
industry's "Know Your Customer" rule-which recommends that the charterer
inquire whether a "pop-up customer" owns a home or has a bank account, that
Executive Jet failed to gather information about the source of the payment, and
that its sister company issued a publication that provided warnings and guidance
regarding potential child abductions and recommended that children carry a no-
tarized letter from the non-traveling parent. Id. at *15-17.
3 Streeter v. Bruderhof Cmtys., 852 A.2d 889, 890-91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)
(the action had already been removed to federal court and then remanded in
part based on a finding that the claims fell outside the scope of the Warsaw
Convention).
3 Id. at 895 (applying the law of the case insofar as the district court held that
there was no bodily injury, which is a prerequisite for recovery under the Warsaw
Convention).
3 Id. A motion to strike two counts of the complaint on the basis of legal insuf-
ficiency also was denied. See Streeter v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., No.
X01CV020179481S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2304 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 29,
2014).
3 Streeter v. Rifton Mgmt, LLC, No. X01CV02179481S, 2004 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 3728, at *4, *48 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 27, 2004).
3 Id. at *15, *19.
- Id. at *19.
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Jet's conduct and that the abduction was within its control."'
The court found that Executive Jet had sufficient information to
suspect that an abduction was planned.4 2 It held that actual
knowledge of the father's wrongful intent was not required for
liability, especially since there was no effort by Executive Jet
even to inquire whether the mother was alive and consented to
the trip-in sum, the harm was reasonably foreseeable."
Having found the harm reasonably foreseeable, the court
concluded:
Where, as here, a private charter company handsomely profits
from the sale of its services rendered with a blind eye regarding
the totality of all of the circumstances surrounding the flight it
arranged, no compelling reason exists to so narrow the scope of
the duty owed to non-passengers who are reasonably foreseeable
victims harmed in reasonably foreseeable ways since that would
encourage lack of vigilance.4 4
The case then went to trial, and the jury awarded Streeter $27
million.4 5 Post-trial motions followed. 6 Executive Jet filed post-
trial motions in which it "for the first time" argued that plain-
tiff's claims were preempted by the ADA.4 Although the court
believed the argument to have been "abandoned," it nonethe-
less analyzed the ADA issue and found that it was not intended
to preempt common law tort claims, particularly when there was
no showing that the claims conflicted with federal oversight or
regulation of air travel. The court also held that the issue of
proximate causation was properly submitted to the jury based
on the evidence of peculiarities regarding the booking of the
flight and Executive Jet's failure to follow industry norms, its sis-
ter company's published recommendations for preventing ab-
41 Id. at *20.
42 Id. at *21-22.
43 Id. at *20-22.
44 Id. at *23. The court also denied summary judgment as to plaintiffs claim
that Executive Jet aided and abetted Wissa's interference with her custodial rela-
tions, finding that the question of whether Executive Jet had sufficient knowl-
edge to impose liability was a question suited for the trier of fact. Id. at *40.
45 Streeter, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3702, at *3.
46 Id. at *4.
47 Id. at *7, *32-34.
48 Id. at *7-9 (citing Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
with approval).
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ductions, or both"9 Finally, the court rejected Executive Jet's
motion to set aside the verdict and for new trial or remittitur.o
Thus, in Streeter, the court rejected arguments of ADA and
Warsaw Convention preemption (as to the non-traveling par-
ent) and found that there was sufficient evidence to support a
verdict that Executive Jet had breached a duty of care to the
non-traveling plaintiff, despite the lack of evidence that Execu-
tive Jet had actual knowledge that the children were being
abducted."
C. BRADEN V. ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS Co.
The next aviation decision involving parental child abduction
was issued in 2010. In Braden v. All Nippon Airways Co., 5 2 Patrick
Braden (Braden), the father of an infant daughter abducted to
Japan on an All Nippon Airways (ANA) flight by her mother,
Ryoko Uchiyama (Uchiyama), asserted claims of negligence and
interference with custodial relations." The claims were based
on ANA's failure to require proof of Braden's consent to the
travel or proof that Uchiyama had sole custody of the child. 4
Braden and Uchiyama were never married but shared legal and
physical custody of their daughter. 5 The trial court dismissed
Braden's amended complaint (after having dismissed the origi-
nal with leave to amend) in part on the basis that his claims were
preempted by the ADA.56
The California Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ANA's
boarding procedures are not services within the meaning of the
ADA.5 7 The court adopted the Ninth Circuit's holding that "ser-
vices" covers "prices, schedules, origins and destinations of the
point-to-point transportation of passengers but not the provision
of in-flight beverages, personal assistance to passengers, the han-
dling of luggage, and similar amenities."5 " The court then held
that "regulating airlines' boarding practices is not preempted by
the ADA because it does not affect economic deregulation and
49 Id. at *15-18.
5o Id. at *61-62.
51 See id.
52 Braden v. All Nippon Airways Co., No. B215440, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 8102 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2010).
5 Id. at *1-2. No action was commenced on behalf of the infant daughter.
54 Id. at *2-3.
55 Id. at *1.
56 Id. at *3.
57 Id. at *4.
58 Id. at *6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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has no impact on prices, schedules, origins, or destinations. Ad-
ditionally, the regulation of airlines' boarding practices is not a
legitimate interest needing protection under the ADA.""'
The court proceeded to analyze the merits of Braden's causes
of action and dismissed each for failure to state a claim.6 o The
court dismissed the negligence cause of action because ANA did
not owe any duty to Braden under California law, which as a
general rule in the absence of a special relationship does not
recognize a duty to control the conduct of a third-party or warn
those endangered by that conduct." The court then dismissed
the intentional interference with custodial relations claim be-
cause ANA did not know that Braden had not consented to the
travel and had no duty to investigate whether Uchiyama's travel
violated a court order."
Thus, here again, the appellate court ultimately determined
that the plaintiffs state law claims were not preempted under
the ADA, and it left open the possibility of liability when the
airline knew the traveling parent was not permitted to travel
with the children."
D. Ko v. EVA ARWAYS CORP.
In Ko v. Eva Airways Corp., Andrew Ko (Ko) asserted causes of
action for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and interference with custodial relations with a minor child aris-
ing out of the abduction of his twin boys to Singapore on an Eva
Airways (EVA) flight by his ex-wife, Yu Xin Wang (Wang) .64 Ko
alleged that EVA violated industry best practices by failing to ob-
tain proof of custody from Wang or a letter of consent from Ko
and that, despite entering such information on a federal system,
EVA also failed to collect 1-94 Departure Cards from the minor
children."
59 Id. at *8.
60 Id. at *9, *14.
61 Id. at *11-13 (citing the Second Circuit's analysis in Pittman v. Grayson, 149
F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) with approval).
62 Id. at *14-15.
65 See id. at *4.
64 Tentative Rulings on: (1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and (2)
Motion to Amend Court's Scheduling Order Dated September 19, 2011 at 1, Ko
v. Eva Airways Corp., No. 2:11-cv-05995-GW-MRW (C.D. Cal. filed July 20, 2011)
(subsequently adopted as the court's final ruling on the motion for judgment on
the pleadings).
65 Id. at 1.
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EVA moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the court dis-
missed the claims as preempted under the ADA. 66 The court
questioned whether the Ninth Circuit's restrictive interpretation
of "services" in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.6 7 remained
valid in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rowe v.
New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n," but it found that the
claims fit even within the Charas definition.6 9 The court then
held that EVA's ticketing and boarding process constituted a
service and that a tort judgment would "directly impact that ser-
vice."o For good measure, the court added:
[I]t is not so clear to this Court that effectively imposing on air-
lines operating in California the obligation to perform certain
measures to determine the proper custodial status of children
traveling with only one adult would not "adversely affect the eco-
nomic deregulation of the airlines and the forces of competition
within the airline industry."7
It is noteworthy that the first court to find ADA preemption of
child abduction claims was a California federal court, as the
Ninth Circuit's definition of "service" is the narrowest among
the Circuits, leading to optimism at the time among air carriers
and their insurers that other courts might follow suit.7 2 Shortly
after the decision in Ko was issued, another court did.
66 Id. at *2, *12. Although the court dismissed based on ADA preemption, find-
ing the Second Circuit's analysis in Pittman, 149 F.3d at 124-25, persuasive and
equally valid under California law, it noted that plaintiff could not state a claim
for negligence because EVA did not owe any duty of care to him. Id. at 3 n.2. The
court further noted that plaintiffs claim for interference with custodial relations
also was not sufficiently pleaded because there was no evidence that EVA "had
knowledge that plaintiff did not consent" to the transportation, nor did it "'ab-
duct' or 'otherwise compel or induce' the children to leave plaintiff." Id.
67 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
68 Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 365-66 (2008).
69 Tentative Rulings on: (1) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and (2)
Motion to Amend Court's Scheduling Order Dated September 19, 2011 at 7-8,
Ko v. Eva Airways Corp., No. 2:11-CV-05995-GW-NRW (C.D. Cal. filed July 20,
2011).
70 Id. at *10.
71 Id. at *10-11 n.8. The court reviewed the district court's decision in Pittman
v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), finding that the ADA analysis ap-
pears untenable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rowe. Id.
72 See Braden v. All Nippon Airways Co., No. B215440, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 8102, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2010).
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E. BOWER V. EGYPTArR AIRLINES Co.
In Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., Colin Bower (Bower) sued
EgyptAir and his ex-wife, Mirvat El-Nady (El-Nady), on behalf of
himself and his two minor children.73 He asserted claims for "in-
terference with custodial relations, negligence, negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and loss of filial consortium" arising
out of El-Nady's abduction of their two minor children to
Egypt. 74 El-Nady drove to JFK International Airport, where she
purchased three one-way business-class tickets to Cairo at a cost
of nearly $10,000.75 El-Nady and the children presented Egyp-
tian passports, and EgyptAir failed to recognize that the chil-
dren's passports had no entry visa evidencing their arrival in the
United States.76 EgyptAir also failed to check for their 1-94 forms
or comment on the fact that the children's last names did not
match El-Nady's.77
EgyptAir filed a motion for summary judgment, which was
granted.7 ' Although the district court rejected EgyptAir's argu-
ments that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the ADA,
the Montreal Convention,so or both, it found that the plaintiffs
could not establish an issue of material fact sufficient to submit
their claims to a jury." The district court dismissed the claims
for interference with Bower's custodial relations based on a lack
of evidence that EgyptAir had actual knowledge of El-Nady's in-
tention to abduct the children, and it dismissed the negligence
73 Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 88, 93 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. de-
nied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3585 (2014).
74 Id. at 88, 93.
75 Id. at 88 (pursuant to the decree granting Bower custody, his ex-wife was
prohibited from taking the children out of Massachusetts).
76 Id.
77 Id. "The 1-94 form is an arrival/departure record issued by Customs and
Border Protection (CBP)," and the departure portion generally must be filled
out and provided to the airline upon departure, which then provides it to CBP.
Id. at 88 n.3. U.S. citizens do not require 1-94 forms. 8 C.F.R. § 231.2(b) (2)
(2014).
78 Bower v. El-Nady, 847 F. Supp. 2d 266, 281 (D. Mass. 2012).
79 Id. at 272-73 (holding that even if the ticketing and check-in procedures are
"services," any impact on them would be incidental and would impact all carriers,
thus negating the possibility that any one carrier would be placed at a competitive
disadvantage). In other words, the district court "felt that the claims did not 're-
late to' the 'services' strongly enough." Bower, 731 F.3d at 95.
80 El-Nady, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74 (finding that the ticketing transaction out
of which plaintiffs' claims arose did not occur within an act of embarking the
aircraft, thus removing the action from the scope of the Convention).
81 Id. at 274-81.
82 Id. at 274.
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claims on the basis that EgyptAir did not owe any duty to the
plaintiffs to investigate whether El-Nady was traveling with her
children in violation of a court order."
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but on the
basis that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the ADA.8 4
The court found that the plaintiffs' state law causes of action
were covered by the ADA's "other provision having force and
effect of law" language and adopted the broader definition of
"service" utilized by a majority of the Circuits.85 The broader def-
inition includes such items as baggage handling, food and bev-
erage service, and ticketing and boarding procedures.' The
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the relation to ser-
vices was too tenuous, remote, or peripheral, and found that the
imposition of liability against EgyptAir would have the effect of
imposing a new set of obligations on the carrier, likely forcing
international airlines departing from states in the First Circuit to
change their policies and procedures to account for the threat
of international abductions."
This First Circuit decision dismissing parental abduction
claims on ADA preemption grounds continued the momentum
that originated with the district court's decision in Ko. The dis-
trict court's rejection of preemption, however, illustrates that
there has been far from uniform handling of these claims, and,
therefore, risk to air carriers remains.
III. LOOKING FORWARD: PREEMPTION OF CLAIMS
ARISING OUT OF PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION
As the foregoing cases reveal, in the absence of preemption,
the determination of liability in an abduction case will depend
83 Id. at 275-81 (finding that EgyptAir owed no duty to Bower because there
was no special relationship sufficient to trigger an exception to the general rule
that there is no duty to control the conduct of a third party so as to prevent him
from harming another. While EgyptAir and the minor plaintiffs were in a special
relationship based on their status as passengers of a common carrier, the court
dismissed the minor plaintiffs' negligence claims as well on the basis that the "red
flags" relied upon by plaintiffs, which allegedly should have alerted EgyptAir to
the abduction, "fell well short of giving EgyptAir a warning of the possibility that
a parental child abduction was afoot," and EgyptAir did not owe the minor plain-
tiffs a duty "to investigate whether their mother was traveling with them in viola-
tion of a court order.").
84 Bower, 731 F.3d at 98.
85 Id. at 93-94.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 96-97.
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on the underlying facts and a patchwork of state laws. While
Streeter remains the only case in which an air carrier ultimately
was held liable for its role in a child abduction, the decisions in
Pittman, Braden, and Bower (the district court decision) do little
to allay fears of huge verdicts under the right set of facts for
interference with custodial relations (in some states, applied as
conspiracy or aiding and abetting)88 or negligence."
Accordingly, preemption under the ADA, the Warsaw/Mon-
treal Convention, or both, is an essential first line of defense to
claims arising out of parental child abduction. It is therefore un-
fortunate that the courts often have misapplied both to the det-
riment of carriers. As is discussed below, a proper analysis leads
to the conclusion that child abduction claims are preempted by
the ADA, and when the transportation is international, the War-
saw and Montreal Conventions as well.
A. PREEMPTION UNDER THE ADA
The defendant in each of the five cases discussed above ar-
gued at some point during the litigation that the plaintiffs'
claims were preempted by the ADA.o Only two were success-
ful.91 A review of the ADA's preemption provision in conjunc-
tion with its legislative history and guidance provided by the
United States Supreme Court, however, leads to the conclusion
that the three courts that rejected the ADA preemption argu-
ment were mistaken.
1. Background of the ADA
The ADA was enacted in 1978 based on Congress's conclusion
that "'maximum reliance on competitive market forces' would
best further 'efficiency, innovation, and low prices' as well as 'va-
88 While a number of states have not yet expressly adopted this cause of action,
an overwhelming majority of the high courts of the states to address this issue
have recognized this tort. See Wyatt v. McDermott, 725 S.E.2d 555, 559-60 (Va.
2012); Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 1999); Anonymous v. Anony-
mous, 672 So. 2d 787, 789 (Ala. 1995); see also Daniel Oberdorfer, Larson v.
Dunn: Toward a Reasoned Response to Parental Kidnapping, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1701,
1714-15 (June 1991). This cause of action is sanctioned by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts (1977) § 700.
89 For example, it seems that at least some courts would submit the issue of
liability to a jury where the non-traveling parent gave warning to high-ranking
officials of an air carrier prior to the transportation, especially if a copy of the
court order awarding custody is provided.
9o See supra Part II.A-E.
91 See supra Part II.D-E.
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riety [and] quality . . . of air transportation services.' 9 2 In an
effort to ensure that the goals of the ADA would not be thwarted
by a spate of state regulation, the ADA included a provision pre-
empting state laws "relating to rates, routes, or services. " The
ADA's preemption provision was set forth at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a) (1), and stated in pertinent part: "[N]o State . . . shall
enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier."9 4
The ADA was recodified in 1994, at which time the preemp-
tion provision was revised to read as follows:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivi-
sion of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier that may provide air transportation under this
subpart."
Congress did not intend for the minor revisions to the text of
the preemption provision (for example, replacement of "rates"
with "price") to make any substantive change to this provision.9 6
On its face, the scope of the ADA's preemption appears clear:
there must be (1) "a law, regulation, or other provision having
the force and effect of law"; and (2) it must "relate[ ] to a price,
route or service of an air carrier." In practice, courts have
found applying this standard exceedingly difficult, and a consis-
tent, clear-cut test remains elusive.98 While it would be hubris for
one to think that he or she has solved the ADA preemption puz-
zle and come up with a clear test, I will say what a number of
courts have implied without expressly stating: "I know it when I
92 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992).
93 Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1705, 1707-08
(1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1) (1982)).
94 See id.
5 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1) (1994).
6 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 223 n.1 (1995) (citing Pub. L.
No. 103-272, § 1(a), 108 Stat. 745 (1994)); H.R. REP. No. 103-677, at 82-83
(1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1755.
97 See, e.g., Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1)).
98 See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that courts have struggled with the relationship between the ADA's
preemption provision and state tort claims, and that results have been
inconsistent).
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see it,"" and state law tort claims against air carriers relating to
parental child abduction are preempted.
2. Provision Having Effect of Law
Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Inc. v.
Ginsberg,00 the cases to address this issue-either expressly or
implicitly-overwhelmingly held that the state tort law impli-
cated by these parental child abduction actions qualifies as a
"provision having the force and effect of law."'O' The Ginsberg
decision ended any debate by expressly holding that "state com-
mon-law rules fall comfortably within the language of the ADA
pre-emption provision. Accordingly, there is little basis for
debate as to whether state tort law causes of action implicated by
parental child abduction suits satisfy this first step in the pre-
emption analysis.
Consequently, the relevant question in each of the parental
child abduction cases to date is whether the state common law
99 SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (in
trying to define obscenity in determining whether a film was obscene, Justice
Stewart famously penned: "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description, and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it,
and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
100 Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014).
101 See Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 93 (1st Cir. 2013) (explain-
ing that state common law claims fall within the scope of the language "other
provision having the force and effect of law"); Brown, 720 F.3d at 64-67; United
Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2000); see also
Wolens, 513 U.S. at 242 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Many cases decided since Morales have allowed personal injury claims to pro-
ceed, even though none has said that a State is not 'enforcing' its 'law' when it
imposes tort liability on an airline."); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S.
658, 664 (1993) (holding that common law fell within scope of phrases "law, rule,
regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety" as used in Federal Rail-
road Safety Act's preemption provision, thus indicating common law also falls
within scope of ADA's preemption provision, which originally included terms
"rule" and "standard."); Onoh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 613 F.3d 596, 599-601 (5th
Cir. 2010) (holding that common law claims are preempted by ADA, thus implic-
itly finding that common law constitutes an "other provision having the force and
effect of law"); Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, 309 F. App'x 483, 484-85 (2d Cir.
2009); Koutsouradis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 427 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005);
Weber v. US Airways, Inc., 11 F. App'x 56, 56-58 (4th Cir. 2001); Anderson v.
USAir, Inc., 818 F.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Hodges v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1995) (Jolly, J., concurring) (disagreeing with
the majority's conclusion that state tort law fell within scope of phrase "law, regu-
lation, or other provision have the force and effect of law").
102 Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
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causes of action raised in these suits are "related to a . .. service
of an air carrier."o3 By definition, this inquiry has two parts: (1)
are the airline activities implicated by these lawsuits "services"
within the meaning of the statute; and (2) if so, do the claims
sufficiently relate to those services to warrant preemption.'0 4
3. Definition of "Service"
The circuit courts of appeal that have attempted to craft a
definition of "service," have, roughly speaking, adopted one of
two definitions:
* The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Elev-
enth Circuits have adopted a broad definition of "ser-
vices," which includes the provision or anticipated
provision of labor to passengers, including baggage han-
dling, in-flight food and beverage provision, and ticketing
and boarding procedures.1 0 5
* The Ninth Circuit, and arguably the Third Circuit, have
adopted a narrow definition of "service," holding that
Congress used the term in reference to "the prices, sched-
ules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point trans-
portation of passengers, cargo, or mail," and that in
context "service" refers to matters such as "the frequency
los See, e.g., Bower, 731 F.3d at 93.
104 See, e.g., id.
105 First Circuit: Bower, 731 F.3d at 94 (noting that the First Circuit had
adopted the broader definition of "service"); see also Brown, 720 F.3d at 64 (im-
plicitly holding that handling of baggage by skycaps is a "service"); DiFiore v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2011); Second Circuit: Air Transp. Ass'n of
Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 222-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (implicitly adopting
broader definition of "service" applied by majority of circuits, while expressly re-
jecting narrow definition applied by Third and Ninth Circuits); see also Weiss, 309
F. App'x at 485 (referring to analysis of "service" set forth in Cuomo); Fourth
Circuit: Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1998) (boarding
procedures undoubtedly are a service rendered by the airline); Fifth Circuit:
Hodges, 44 F.3d at 336 (adopting en banc the broad definition of "services" set
forth by the panel, and noting that the broad definition was "inferentially rein-
forced by the Court's decision in American Airlines v. Wolens."); see also Onoh, 613
F.3d at 599-600 (confirming the continuing validity of the definition of "services"
set forth in Hodges); Sixth Circuit: Wellons v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 493, 495
(6th Cir. 1999) (accepting Northwest's contention that the "selection of reserva-
tion clerks has 'a connection with' services-i.e., airline reservations-provided
by the airline through its personnel"); Seventh Circuit: Travel All Over the
World, Inc. v. Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1433 (7th Cir. 1996) (adopting Fifth
Circuit's definition of "services"); Eleventh Circuit: Branche v. Airtran Airways,




and scheduling of transportation," and "the selection of
markets."106 It clarified that it does not "include an air-
line's provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance
to passengers, the handling of luggage, and similar
amenities." 0
The ticketing and boarding procedures implicated by paren-
tal child abduction claims clearly fit within the majority defini-
tion of "service." While ticketing and boarding procedures do
not fit within the minority definition of "service," the minority
view appears to contradict the text and intent of the ADA. For
example, in implementing the ADA, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB)"'o stated: "preemption extends to all of the economic fac-
tors that go into the provision of the quid pro quo for passenger's
[sic] fare, including flight frequency and timing, liability limits,
reservation and boarding practices, insurance, smoking rules,
meal service, entertainment, bonding and corporate financ-
ing."109 The CAB added:
[A] state may not interfere with the services that carriers offer in
exchange for their rates and fares. For example, liquidated dam-
ages for bumping (denial of boarding), segregation of smoking
passengers, minimum liability for loss, damages and delayed bag-
gage, and ancillary charges for headsets, alcoholic beverages, en-
tertainment, and excess baggage would clearly be "service"
regulation within the meaning of section 105.110
The narrow definition also appears to be contrary to the gui-
dance provided by the United States Supreme Court in Morales
106 Charas v. TransWorld Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259, 1261, 1265-66 (9th Cir.
1998); see also Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 223 (noting that the Third Circuit has con-
strued the term "services" in the same manner as the Ninth Circuit); Taj Mahal
Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 193-94 (3d Cir. 1998) (seeming
to approve of the Ninth Circuit's definition of "service," but focusing on whether
"a common law tort remedy frustrates deregulation by interfering with competi-
tion through public utility-style regulation"). But see Adams v. US Airways Group,
Inc., No. 12-5603, 2013 WL 5676356, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2013) (holding that
the Third Circuit's decision in Taj Mahal indicated an intent to adopt the Charas
definition of "service," but noting that other district courts in the circuit had
applied the majority definition because the Third Circuit did not expressly adopt
Charas' definition).
107 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261.
108 The Civil Aeronautics Board is the entity that had economic regulatory au-
thority over interstate air transportation until the deregulation imposed by the
ADA. See, e.g., Hodges, 44 F.3d at 335; Charas, 160 F.3d at 1262.
10- Implementation of Preemption Provisions of the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, 44 Fed. Reg. 9948, 9951 (Feb. 15, 1979).
110 Id.
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and Wolens that the ADA's preemption provision was intended
to have a broad scope."' It is the Supreme Court's decision in
Rowe, however, that appears definitively to have rendered the
minority definition unworkable. 1 1 2
Thus, the majority definition of "service" better embodies the
intent and purpose of the ADA as well as the Supreme Court's
guidance; the ticketing and boarding procedures implicated by
child abduction claims fall within that definition. Accordingly,
the remaining issue is whether the claims sufficiently relate to
the service to warrant preemption.
4. Relation to the "Service"
Any analysis of the phrase "relating to" must begin with the
Supreme Court. In Morales, the Court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether state laws setting forth detailed standards for
advertising (specifically the Travel Industry Enforcement Guide-
lines composed by the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral as they related to airline fare advertising) were preempted
III Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (stating that
the language of the ADA's preemption provision "express[es] a broad pre-emp-
tive purpose"); Wolens, 513 U.S. at 245-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Without question, Morales gave § 1405 a broad pre-emptive
sweep," which Congress "did not intend to alter" when it revisited § 1305 in
1994.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Brown, 720 F.3d at 68 ("[T]he so-
called presumption against preemption" is inapplicable to the ADA because the
statute's contrary purpose is apparent.); DiFiore, 646 F.3d at 86 (1st Cir. 2011)
(explaining that all three major Supreme Court cases read the preemption lan-
guage broadly, and none suggested a presumption against preemption in areas
historically occupied by state law); Onoh, 613 F.3d at 599 (noting that the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the ADA's preemptive scope broadly); Cuomo, 520
F.3d at 222 ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the breadth of
the ADA's preemption provision."). But see Taj Mahal, 164 F.3d at 192 ("[T] he
interpretation of even express preemption provisions such as the one in the Act
must begin with the 'presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law.'").
112 See Bower, 731 F.3d at 94 ("In our view, Rowe forecloses the Charas interpre-
tation of 'service' as a term closely related to prices and routes."); Cuomo, 520
F.3d at 223 (noting that Rowe "necessarily defined 'service' to extend beyond
prices, schedules, origins and destinations"); Tentative Rulings on: (1) Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, and (2) Motion to Amend Court's Scheduling
Order Dated September 19, 2011 at 7, Ko v. Eva Airways Corp., No. 2:1 1-cv-05995-
GW-MRW (C.D. Cal. filed July 20, 2011) ("In fact, there is at least some basis to
question whether Charas's definition is even valid any longer."); Foley v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., No. C 10-3882 JCS, 2011 WL 3359730, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
2011) ("The United States, in its Statement of Interest filed in United Airlines, and
some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have called into question the validity of
Charas's definition of 'service' after the Supreme Court's ruling in Rowe.").
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under the ADA."' The Court began its analysis with the ordi-
nary definition of the key phrase, "relating to," which it found to
"express a broad pre-emptive purpose."'1 4 It then adopted a
standard where "[s]tate enforcement actions having a connec-
tion with or reference to airline 'rates, routes, or services' are
pre-empted under [the ADA].""
In adopting this broad definition, the Court largely disre-
garded the FAA's "saving" clause as a "general 'remedies' saving
clause" that "cannot be allowed to supersede the specific sub-
stantive pre-emption provision," especially where, as here, "the
'saving' clause is a relic of the pre-ADA/no preemption re-
gime."H6 The Court also cautioned that the preemptive scope is
not limited to provisions specifically addressed to the airline in-
dustry, but rather, encompasses laws of general applicability that
have only an indirect effect on rates, routes, or services."1 '
The Court found that the NAAG guidelines "obviously" re-
lated to "rates," as "every one of the guidelines enumerated
above bears a 'reference to' airfares," but added for good mea-
sure that " [i] n any event," the "state restrictions on fare advertis-
ing have the forbidden significant effect upon fares.""' The
Court's use of the phrase "[i]n any event" is interesting, as it
seems to indicate that the "forbidden significant effect upon
fares" might be sufficient to support preemption, but is not nec-
essary.' 19 The Court clarified that not every law that relates to
rates, routes, or services is preempted, as "'some state actions
may affect [airline fares] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner' to have [a] pre-emptive effect," giving state laws against
gambling and prostitution as examples."'o
The Court did not provide any significant further guidance
regarding the meaning of "related to" in American Airlines v.
Wolens, the second of three Supreme Court cases addressing the
113 Morales, 504 U.S. at 379.
114 Id. at 383.
115 Id. at 384.
116 Id. at 384-85.
117 Id. at 386.
118 Id. at 387-88.
119 See id.; see also Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008)
("[P]re-emption occurs at least where state laws have a 'significant impact' re-
lated to Congress' deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives."). In Wolens,
however, the Court described its decision in Morales as having "emphasized that
the challenged guidelines . . . imposed [obligations that] would have a significant
impact upon . . . the fares [airlines] charge. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 224.
120 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390.
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ADA's preemption provision.121 The Court instead focused on
whether state contract law constituted a "provision having the
force and effect of law."12 2
In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n, the Court had
another chance to provide guidance on interpreting the phrase
"relating to," when it considered whether several provisions of a
Maine statute regulating the delivery and sale of tobacco prod-
ucts were preempted under the Federal Aviation Administration
Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA), whose preemption provi-
sion was taken from the ADA.' 2 3 The provisions in question (1)
required retailers of tobacco products to employ delivery ser-
vices that would verify a number of facts about the person to
whom the tobacco products were being delivered; and (2) pro-
hibited any person from knowingly transporting a tobacco prod-
uct to anyone in Maine unless the sender or receiver had a
Maine license.124
The Court cautioned that the FAAAA's preemption provision
should be interpreted identically to that set forth in the ADA
and incorporated its guidance in Morales.12 The Court held that
the statutes were preempted because they (1) had a significant
and adverse impact on the objectives of the FAAAA (forcing car-
riers to offer a new system or services, or at a minimum, freeze
into place services that carriers might otherwise prefer to discon-
tinue); (2) would require carriers to offer tobacco delivery ser-
vices significantly different from those that the market might
dictate in the absence of the regulation; and (3) would lead to a
patchwork of state laws, rules, and regulations, regardless of
whether the regulation would impose any significant additional
cost upon carriers.126
Thus, the Supreme Court's decisions in Wolens and Rowe seem
to tell us the following about what constitutes a sufficient rela-
tionship between "a law, regulation, or other provision having
the force and effect of law" and a carrier's "price, route, or ser-
vice": the analysis must begin with a determination of whether
the provision in question has a connection with or reference to
airline rates, routes, or services, keeping in mind the ADA's
broad preemptive scope.
121 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 226.
122 Id.
123 Rowe, 552 U.S. at 367-68.
124 Id. at 368-69.
125 Id. at 370.
126 Id. at 371-73.
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* The provision need not specifically address the airline in-
dustry, but rather, may be a provision of general applica-
bility that has only an indirect effect on rates, routes or
services;
* The provision in question has a significant impact related
to Congress's deregulatory and preemption-related
objectives;
* It is likely sufficient that the provision has a significant ef-
fect upon prices, routes, or services, although this is not
necessary; and
* While the cost imposed upon carriers as a result of the
provision, or the lack thereof, is not determinative of the
analysis, provisions whose relationship to "prices, routes or
services" are too tenuous, remote, or peripheral, are not
preempted.
A number of courts have attempted to develop a definitive
approach to address the preemption issue. One such approach
draws a distinction between "services" provided by the airline
and conduct connected with the "operation and maintenance of
the aircraft," with claims for physical injury or property damage
caused by the operation or maintenance of the aircraft not be-
ing preempted. 1 2 7 Other courts, however, have rejected this ap-
proach,12 8 with its shortcomings highlighted by the Ninth
Circuit in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. The Charas court
noted that under this approach, "a plaintiff injured when struck
by a beverage cart door would be able to bring a tort action if
the door swung open because a bolt was missing. . . , but not if
the flight attendant negligently failed to latch the door properly
"129
127 See, e.g., Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that "federal preemption of state laws, even certain common law actions 're-
lated to services' of an air carrier, does not displace state tort actions for personal
physical injuries or property damages caused by the operation and maintenance
of aircraft"); Smith v. Am. W. Airlines, 44 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying
the Hodges framework); Gill v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 836 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40-41
(D. Mass. 2011).
128 See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.
1998) (rejecting the distinction between "operation or maintenance of aircraft"
and "service").
129 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 1998)
("As Judges O'Scannlain and Jolly predicted in their respective concurrences in
Gee and Hodges, the distinction between an airline's operations and its service
turned out to be as elusive as it is unworkable.").
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A second approach focuses on the congressional intent to
achieve economic deregulation of the airline industry."so This
approach, however, has also met with its share of critics.'
A third approach focuses on the economic impact of the pro-
vision at issue, holding that preemption is proper if it has a sig-
nificant economic impact on services. 3 2 Despite the language in
Morales evidencing the relevance of economic impact, this ap-
proach also has its detractors.1 3 3
Finally, one last method for evaluating whether tort claims
sufficiently relate to a service to support preemption was set
forth by now-Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor in Rombom v.
United Airlines, Inc.'3 4 Under this test, courts first determine
whether the activity at issue is an airline service and, if so,
whether the claim affects the airline service directly, or does so
tenuously, remotely or peripherally.1 3 1 If the activity is a service
and the claim directly affects it, the claims will be preempted as
long as the "underlying tortious conduct was reasonably neces-
sary to the provision of the service."' 6 In Rombom, the plaintiff's
claims arose out of the flight crew's treatment of her after she
allegedly caused a disturbance during the in-flight safety instruc-
tions.1 3 7 The court held that Rombom's claims stemming from
her arrest would not be preempted if, as she claimed, her arrest
130 See Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261; Taj Mahal, 164 F.3d at 194.
131 See United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 608-09 (7th
Cir. 2000) ("Opinions ... which say that state law is preempted by § 105(a) (1)
only if it 'frustrates Congressional intent [or] impose [s] a state utility-like regula-
tion on the airlines', cannot be reconciled with Wolens.").
132 See, e.g., Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1258-59 (11th Cir.
2003) (explaining that the connection necessary for preemption is established by
showing the state law directly regulates such services or has a significant eco-
nomic impact on them); Travel All Over the World v. Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423,
1432 (7th Cir. 1996).
13 See Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting
this test as not being "the correct analysis post-Rowe," which "shows that non-
economic laws that nonetheless have a significant regulatory effect on the airlines
are preempted"); DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2011)
("[P] reemption might have been confined to state laws that themselves aimed at
economic regulation as opposed to other state interests, but that course too has
been foreclosed.").
134 Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
135 Id.
136 Id. at 222.
137 Id. at 216.
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was motivated by spite and not because it was the only way to
remove her from the aircraft.1 3 8
The third prong set forth in Rombom appears to reflect the
possibility that an airline's act may relate to a service on its face,
but be so outrageous as to make that action's relation to the
service too tenuous, remote, or peripheral to support preemp-
tion."' During oral argument, the court asked whether a pas-
senger's state tort claims would be preempted if a flight
attendant asked him to be quiet during the safety instructions
and then shot him when he refused.140
With all due respect to Justice Sotomayor, the third prong of
her test seems only to stand for the proposition that even where
claims may on their face appear to relate directly to a service,
the specific facts of the case may show that the actions in dispute
relate to that service in a tenuous, remote, or peripheral man-
ner, rendering the third prong simply a different way to look at
the second prong."' Thus, it is unclear how this test makes ADA
preemption analysis any simpler.
Moreover, some courts seem to interpret the test to weigh
against preemption whenever claims arise out of the alleged
negligent provision of a service-this is a misapplication of Jus-
tice Sotomayor's opinion and an inaccurate oversimplification
of the ADA preemption standard.4 2 Although many courts held
138 Id. at 224.
139 See also Smith v. Comair, 134 F.3d 254, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Rombon,
867 F. Supp. at 222, 224) ("Suits stemming from outrageous conduct on the part
of an airline toward a passenger will not be preempted under the ADA if the
conduct too tenuously relates or is unnecessary to an airline's services.").
140 Rombom, 867 F. Supp. at 222; see also N. Cypress Med. Ctr. v. FedEx Corp.,
892 F. Supp. 2d 861, 868 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (applying the tripartite test enunciated
in Rombom to find that the claims arising out of the dropping of a box and failure
to collect documents that scattered when the box opened were preempted, while
claims arising out of FedEx's deliberate decision to conceal the damage were
only tenuously related to the service itself, and therefore not preempted).
141 This is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Morales that state
laws against gambling and prostitution would not be preempted, as any relation-
ship between such statutes and airline service would be tenuous because gam-
bling and prostitution are not services associated with transportation by air. See
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 390 (1992). If gambling and
prostitution were "services" commonly associated with air travel, it seems unlikely
that the Court would so cavalierly state that state laws inhibiting those activities
would be exempt from preemption, and it would be expected that Congress
would step in to outlaw such activities.
142 See, e.g., Donkor v. British Airways Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 963, 972 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) ("[W]hen negligence in the provision of a service causes injury, the claim
may not be preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act."); Trinidad v. Am. Air-
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that the ADA did not intend to preempt tort claims arising out
of personal injury, there is no bright-line rule.'
So, in light of the foregoing, we are left with one obvious
question.
5. Is There Any Workable Standard That Can Be Applied?
It is easier to point out flaws in tests set forth by others than to
fashion a proper one, and, unfortunately, I have not fashioned
the one-size-fits-all test that has to date eluded some of the best
jurists in the country."'
Thus, in evaluating whether parental child abduction claims
are preempted, we are left with the guidance provided by the
Supreme Court in Morales (and to a lesser extent Wolens and
Rowe), the potentially relevant factors enunciated by the circuit
courts of appeal and other courts,14 5 and those famous words of
Justice Stewart in Jacobellis. "I know it when I see it."' 4 6 Wen it
comes to a question of whether parental child abduction claims
lines, 932 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (referencing Rombom and holding
that negligence claims arising out of flight into turbulent airspace without warn-
ing were not preempted despite the fact that they related to the service the air-
line provided).
143 Compare Ginsberg v. Nw., Inc., 695 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2012), rev'd and
remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1422 (2014) (asserting that "[i] n Wolens all the justices-
including the dissenters-agreed that the ADA does not preempt common law
tort claims such as personal injury and wrongful death") with Am. Airlines v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 242-43 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (noting that her view does not mean that personal injury claims
are always preempted, and that many courts have allowed personal injury claims
to proceed where the claims did not relate to services, much as the Court in
Morales had suggested with regard to laws against gambling and prostitution); see
also Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 95 (1st Cir. 2013) (acknowledg-
ing that personal injury'claims are generally not preempted by the ADA but hold-
ing that there were "numerous distinctions" between the claims asserted in this
case and personal injury claims).
144 See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1997)
(remarking that the ADA preemption clause provides an "illusory test," and that
it could "offer no bright line relief," instead having to apply the provision on a
case-by-case basis); Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423,
1433 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Morales does not permit us to develop broad rules con-
cerning whether certain types of common-law claims are preempted by the ADA.
Instead, we must examine the underlying facts of each case to determine whether
the particular claims at issue 'relate to' airline rates, routes or services.").
145 While no court has come up with a one-size-fits-all test for evaluating pre-
emption under the ADA, all the factors set forth by these courts help to evaluate
preemption on a case-by-case basis.
146 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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are preempted by the ADA, I know what I see, and I see claims
that are preempted.
* Whether the claims are for interference with custodial re-
lations or negligence, or some other related tort, they im-
plicate the ticketing, check-in and boarding of passengers,
each of which is a "service" as that term is used in the
ADA's preemption provision."'
* The relationship between the state law claims being as-
serted in these cases and the "services" provided by the air-
lines is substantial, not tenuous. A finding of liability
against air carriers for claims arising out of child abduc-
tion will have a direct and substantial impact on carriers'
ticketing, check-in, and boarding procedures relating to
the handling of single adults traveling with children.""s
* As the decisions of these cases undoubtedly will not be uni-
form, the requirements imposed will not be uniform.
Thus, allowing these types of claims to proceed runs the
risk of a patchwork of "state regulations" for the handling
of single adults traveling with minors.149
* The insurance provision set forth at 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a)
is not implicated because the insurance provision requires
insurance to pay "for bodily injury to, or death of," passen-
gers, and parental abduction claims do not involve bodily
injury.150
A majority of cases dealing with state tort claims arising out of
denial of boarding have been preempted.15 ' The parental child
abduction cases implicate the decision to allow passengers to
14 See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1705.
148 See Bower, 731 F.3d at 98.
14 Id. at 96, 97 (analogizing the additional verification duties that would be
imposed on airlines if defendants were found liable to the statutory verification
duties the Court found preempted in Rowe); DiFiore v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 646
F.3d 81, 88 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that application of Massachusetts's tip statute
operates in same manner as a guideline expressly condemning the same conduct
even though statute is mediated by ajury); United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines,
Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding preemption only where state
law imposes a state utility-like regulation on airline contrary to holding in
Wolens.); see also COMMERCIAL AVIATION, supra note 2, at 19-20 (noting that air-
lines are ill-equipped to implement the procedures necessary to thwart parental
child abduction).
150 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (2006); see also Bower, 731 F.3d at 95.
151 See, e.g., Onoh v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 613 F.3d 596, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2010);
Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, 309 F. App'x 483, 485 (2d Cir. 2009); Weber v. US
Airways, Inc., 11 F. App'x 56, 58 (4th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Comair, 134 F.3d 254,
259 (4th Cir. 1998); see also Travel All Over the World v. Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d.
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board an aircraft. There is no reason why the decision to board
a passenger should have a different result than the decision to
deny boarding. Accordingly, the courts in Bower and Ko were
correct in finding state law claims arising out of a child abduc-
tion preempted, and the courts in Pittman, Streeter, and Braden
were mistaken.
B. PREEMPTION UNDER THE WARSAW/MONTREAL CONVENTION
Three of the five parental child abduction cases discussed ad-
dressed the potential applicability of the Warsaw Convention/
Montreal Convention (the Convention) to the plaintiffs'
claims.1 5 2 In Bower, the court determined that the Convention
did not apply to either the non-traveling parent or minor chil-
dren's claims.1 5 1 In Streeter, the court determined that the Con-
vention applied to and preempted claims on behalf of the
minor children but not to the non-traveling parent.154 Finally, in
Pittman, the court conceded that the plaintiffs' claims arose out
of international transportation, and therefore fell within the
scope of the Convention, but the court determined that because
there was no Article 17 "accident," their state law claims survived
the defendant's motion to dismiss.'5 5 This issue is important:
even if the plaintiffs are able to establish an Article 17 "acci-
dent," which as noted below is far from certain, the Convention
precludes recovery for the mental injuries that result from these
abductions, and therefore will often preclude recovery.
1. The Convention's Applicability to Claims by Traveling Minors
Although there is little case law providing direct guidance on
this issue, as is evidenced by the dearth of case law cited by
EgyptAir in support of its motion to dismiss and opposition to
1423, 1434 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that fraud claims expressly referred to airline
"services," which included ticketing, and were thus preempted under the ADA).
152 Many provisions of the Montreal Convention are taken from the Warsaw
Convention. Accordingly, courts have consistently applied cases interpreting the
Warsaw Convention to interpret substantively similar provisions of the Montreal
Convention. See, e.g., Jacob v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 12-62384, 2014
WL243150, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2014); Paradis v. Ghana Airways Ltd., 348 F.
Supp. 2d 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). As the provisions relevant here are substan-
tively identical regardless of which Warsaw Treaty applies, it is of no consequence
which treaty actually would apply to the incident at issue.
153 Bower v. El-Nady, 847 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273-74 (D. Mass. 2012).
154 Streeter v. Bruderhof Cmtys., 48 Conn. Supp. 554, 564 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2003).
155 Pittman v. Grayson, 869 F. Supp. 1065, 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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the appeal on this issue, 156 a review of analogous cases supports
the conclusion that claims by the traveling minors fall within the
scope of the Convention. The scope of the Convention's appli-
cability to passenger injury claims is set forth in Article 17 of the
Convention,1 5 7 which states: "The carrier is liable for damage
sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon
condition only that the accident which caused the death or in-
jury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking."1 5 8 Thus, Article
17.1 sets forth a three-part test whereby the carrier is liable
under the Convention only if: (1) there is an "accident" (2) that
caused "death or bodily injury" (3) that "took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking. "159
The first step temporally in this analysis is to determine
whether the operative event occurred on the aircraft or during
the period of embarking or disembarking because the Conven-
tion applies on the aircraft only.16 0 In Bower, the parties did not
dispute that the events during ticketing and check-in did not fall
156 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 55-64, Bower v. E1-Nady, 731 F.3d 85 (1st
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1427); Defendant EgyptAir Airlines Company's Memorandum
of Law in Support of its Motion for SummaryJudgment at 9-14 and Reply Memo-
randum of Law in Further Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment at
10-15, Bower v. E1-Nady, 847 F. Supp. 2d 266 (2012) (No. 10-10405-R6S).
157 The author assumes for purposes of this analysis that transportation by air
falls within the scope of Article 1(2) of the Convention, meaning that there is
transportation between two parties to the same treaty, or transportation within
one party that includes a stop in another State (i.e., round-trip transportation
beginning and ending in a country that is party to a treaty with a stop in another
country). See Avero Belg. Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that the United States did not accede to Hague Protocol when it be-
came party to Montreal Protocol 4); Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214
F.3d 301, 314 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that there are no treaty relations between
the United States, which was party to Warsaw Convention, and the Republic of
Korea, which was party to Hague Protocol).
158 Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 17.1 (Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol and the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol and Montreal Protocol 4
are substantively identical to Article 17.1 of the Montreal Convention).
159 See id.
160 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 171-72 (1999)
(noting that the Convention only addresses airline liability for passenger injuries
occurring on board the aircraft or during the course of embarking or disembark-
ing and that "[t]he Convention's preemptive effect on local law extends no fur-
ther than the Convention's own substantive scope").
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within the Convention's scope, yet the travel itself did.1 6 ' Thus,
the central dispute in determining whether the Convention gov-
erned was whether the relevant event was the airline's failure to
realize that an abduction was occurring during ticketing or
check-in, or the actual transportation of the minor plaintiffs to
Egypt on the EgyptAir flight.'6 2
Case law suggests that while the ticketing and check-in might
be relevant to the accident analysis, the actual transportation
and abduction by air of the minor passenger(s) certainly is.16 In
Air France v. Saks, which involved injuries sustained by a passen-
ger as the result of the normal operation of the cabin's pressuri-
zation system, the Supreme Court set forth the definition of
"accident" under the Warsaw Convention.'6 4 In defining acci-
dent, and distinguishing it from the contributory negligence de-
fense set forth by Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the
Court explained that
[t]he "accident" requirement of Article 17 is distinct from the
defenses in Article 20(1), both because it is located in a separate
article and because it involves an inquiry into the nature of the
event which caused the injury rather than the care taken by the
airline to avert the injury.16 5
While factually distinguishable from the type of case discussed
in Saks, the airline's care or alleged lack thereof in diagnosing a
parental child abduction during ticketing and check-in more ac-
curately falls within the category of "care taken by the airline to
avert the injury," while the abduction itself would be the "event
161 Bower v. El-Nady, 847 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273-74 (D. Mass. 2012); Brief of
Defendant-Appellee, supra note 156, at 58-60, Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
at 32-37, Bower v. El-Nady, 731 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1427).
162 In determining whether the Convention applies to the question of an air-
line's liability for death or bodily injury, courts employ a totality of the circum-
stances approach with several particularly relevant factors: (1) the passenger's
activity at the time of the incident; (2) the passenger's location at the time of the
incident; (3) the amount of control exercised by the carrier over the passenger at
the time of the injury; and (4) the imminence of boarding. See Marotte v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002); Kingv. Am. Airlines, 284 F.3d
352, 359 (2d Cir. 2002). The author assumes for purposes of this article, as did
the parties in Bower, that the carrier's failure to recognize an abduction during
ticketing and check-in generally will occur prior to the course of embarking,
while the abduction itself occurs during the international transportation by air.
Unfortunately, none of the cases applying the "totality of the circumstances ap-
proach" resolve the issue of what events are relevant to the test.
16s See El-Nady, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 273-74.
164 Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 394, 405 (1985).
165 Id. at 407.
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which caused the injury.""' Thus, these cases tend to indicate
that only the air transportation is relevant to the "accident" anal-
ysis and therefore whether claims arising out of an abduction
fall within the scope of the Convention.
Alternatively, some case law indicates that both the actual
transportation by air and the events during ticketing and check-
in are relevant. In Olympic Airvays v. Husain, the plaintiff com-
menced litigation on behalf of herself and her deceased hus-
band to recover for his alleged wrongful death resulting from
exposure to ambient cigarette smoke on an Olympic Airways
flight after a flight attendant refused three separate requests to
move the decedent from the smoking section.16 7 The issue
before the Supreme Court was whether the decedent's death re-
sulted from an Article 17 "accident," with the airline arguing
that there was no "accident" because the decedent's internal re-
action to the normal smoking on the aircraft was the relevant
event, and the plaintiff countering that the relevant event was
the flight attendant's refusal to allow the decedent to change
seats.'
The Court noted that "petitioner's 'injury producing event'
inquiry-which looks to 'the precise factual "event" that caused
the injury'-neglects the reality that there are often multiple in-
terrelated factual events that combine to cause any given injury,"
adding that in Saks, it had recognized that any one of these fac-
tual events might be a link in the chain of causes and could
satisfy the "accident" inquiry.' 9 The Court added: "Indeed, the
very fact that multiple events will necessarily combine and inter-
relate to cause any particular injury makes it difficult to define,
in any coherent or non-question-begging way, any single event
166 See Damon v. Air Pac. Ltd., 203 F. App'x 33, 34-35 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting
in DVT failure to warn case that the passenger's affliction with DVT was the rele-
vant event for the "accident" inquiry, while the airline's failure to warn would be
care taken to avert the injury is relevant to a determination of whether the Article
20(1) "all necessary measures defense is available to the carrier."); Caman v.
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 455 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2006); Miller v. Cont'l Airlines,
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 931, 937-38 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that allegations that
DVT was caused by defective design and outfitting of aircraft were not sufficient
to take claims outside scope of Convention); Magan v. Lufthansa German Air-
lines, 181 F. Supp. 2d 396, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that airline's failure to
warn passenger of anticipated turbulence was not relevant to the "accident" de-
termination), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
167 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 646-48 (2004).
168 Id. at 652-54.
169 Id. at 653.
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as the'injury producing event."' 7 0 In Husain, "[t] he exposure to
the smoke and the refusal to assist the passenger are happenings
that both contributed to the passenger's death."'7 1 Based on the
Court's analysis in Husain, both the airline's failure to detect an
abduction during ticketing and check-in and the abduction it-
self would be relevant to the determination of whether the Con-
vention applies.1 7 2
Although all of the above cases focused on whether an "acci-
dent" had occurred, they nonetheless provide guidance as to the
events relevant to whether an incident falls within the scope of
Article 17 at all.173 Thus, it seems clear that the Convention gov-
erns claims asserted on behalf of the traveling minor children.
2. The Non-Traveling Parent
It is a separate question whether the Convention governs
claims by the non-traveling parent (i.e., whether the Convention
governs claims by non-passengers when those claims relate to
injuries sustained by passengers that fall within the scope of the
Convention). Although the cases are sparse, the courts that have
addressed this issue have held that the Convention does in fact
provide for claims by non-passengers. In Miller v. Continental Air-
lines, Inc., the court examined whether a derivative claim for loss
of consortium was permitted under and governed by the Con-
vention, and noted:
Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the Convention's preemptive
range is not limited solely to claims by the international traveler.
Instead, the Convention's "cardinal purpose," as observed by the
Supreme Court and recited earlier in this order, is to achieve
uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international
air transportation generally. Thus, the Convention extends to
170 Id.
171 Id. at 654.
172 See generally id.
173 Some of the confusion may result from to the fact that there is no one
obvious moment of injury in parental child abduction cases. Rather, it is the en-
tirety of the transportation (i.e., the abduction) that is the injury-producing
event. Nevertheless, it is clear that the abduction is relevant for purposes of the
"accident" analysis, much as the act of another passenger is relevant in any pas-
senger on passenger tort case. If the focus of the "accident" inquiry was only on
the allegedly wrongful act(s) of the carrier, as the plaintiffs in Bower argued, the
Convention would not apply to any event caused by the carrier's alleged negli-
gence prior to the flight, such as defective maintenance of the aircraft or negli-
gent security that failed to prevent a threat to the flight or passengers, which is
inconsistent with Article 17's text and the intent of the drafters.
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claims by non-passengers based on events during international
air travel. Even Article 17, which provides the exclusive remedy
for personal injuries under the Convention, delineates liability in
universal terms and not merely in terms personal to the
passenger.174
As the district court in Diaz Lugo v. American Airlines noted, Arti-
cle 17 also has been interpreted to allow independent actions
for wrongful death.1 7 1
Admittedly, claims asserted by non-traveling parents in cases
of abduction are distinguishable from those for loss of consor-
tium or wrongful death in that they arise out of the event gov-
erned by the Convention (i.e., the abduction by international
transportation by air), not the injury or death resulting from the
event.
Thus, while the comparative negligence provision set forth in
Article 20 of the Montreal Convention states:
When by reason of death or injury of a passenger compensation
is claimed by a person other than the passenger, the carrier shall
likewise be wholly or partly exonerated from its liability to the
extent that it proves that the damage was caused or contributed
to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of that
passenger,17 6
it does not provide guidance for the non-traveling parent's
claims, which do not arise directly out of death or injury of the
"passenger," as it does for loss of consortium or wrongful death
claims, which do."'
While the applicability of the Convention to claims by the
non-traveling parent therefore presents a close question, and
one for which the Convention's Drafting History appears to pro-
vide little guidance, the Convention's goal of uniformity seems
to weigh in favor of finding non-traveling parents' claims to be
governed by the Convention. 7 s
'7 Miller v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 931, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(citation omitted); see also Diaz Lugo v. Am. Airlines, 686 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D.
P.R. 1988) (Article 17's "language does not limit the recoverable damages to
those suffered by the passenger. The article does not state that American shall be
liable for damage sustained by a passenger if he dies or suffers bodily injury; it says
American will be liable for damages sustained without specifying who suffers them.").
175 Diaz Lugo, 686 F. Supp. at 376.
176 Montreal Convention, supra note 10, art. 20.
177 Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 156, at 55-64 (making this
argument).
178 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 (1999) (not-
ing the Warsaw Convention's cardinal purpose of achieving uniformity with re-
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Thus, the holdings of the district courts in Bower v. EgyptAir
Airlines Co. and Streeter v. Bruderhof Communities that the non-trav-
eling parents' claims were not governed by the Warsaw/Mon-
treal Convention were incorrect.
3. The Convention Preempts State Law Claims and Precludes
Liability Against Air Carriers
It is well settled that where the Convention applies, it does so
exclusively and preempts all state law causes of action within its
scope.17 9 Thus, state law claims for interference with custodial
relations, negligence, etc., which arise out of a parental child
abduction are preempted if the Convention applies.
Moreover, because these claims do not involve allegations of
bodily injury,1so recovery is not permitted under the Convention
because purely emotional injuries are not compensable.1 8 ' Ac-
cordingly, a finding that the Convention applies to claims aris-
ing out of a parental child abduction will preclude liability
against the air carrier.18 2
gard to the rules governing claims arising from international air transportation);
King v. Am. Airlines, 284 F.3d 352, 361 (2d Cir. 2002) (taking into account the
Convention's goal of uniformity in interpreting the treaty); Brink's Ltd. v. S. Afri-
can Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that the court's method of
interpreting ambiguous treaty provisions helps foster the goal of uniformity);
Richards v. Sing. Airlines Ltd., No. 13-06771, 2013 WL 6405868, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 2013) (noting the Montreal Convention's goal to promote uniformity and
predictability in the laws governing air carrier liability).
179 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 171-72, 176 (holding that the Warsaw Convention
exclusively governs all claims within its scope and preempts all state law causes of
action); see, e.g., Bridgeman v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc., 552 F. App'x 294,
296 (5th Cir. 2013) (the Montreal Convention preempts state law causes of ac-
tion relating to international carriage of persons, baggage, and cargo, but only to
the extent they fall within the Convention's substantive scope); Booker v. BWIA
W. Indies Airways Ltd., 307 F. App'x 491, 493 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that state
law claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention); Acevedo-Reinoso v.
Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana SA., 449 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that
the Montreal Convention preempts state law claims within its scope).
180 If an event occurs during international transportation by air that results in a
bodily injury, this must be analyzed separately under the Convention. See Mon-
treal Convention, supra note 10, art. 17.1.
181 See, e.g., E. Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991); Bassam v. Am. Air-
lines, 287 F. App'x 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2008); Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360
F.3d 366, 376, 400 (2d Cir. 2004).
182 I would be remiss if I failed to note that there also is a question as to
whether parental child abduction constitutes an "accident" under Article 17 of
the Convention. For example, in Bower, EgyptAir Airlines Co. argued that an "ac-
cident" finding requires that there was (1) an unexpected or unusual event or




Parental child abduction is an issue of increasing concern to
society as a whole and to airlines in particular. In light of the
increasing number of abductions each year, a majority of which
are accomplished through international transportation by air,
claims against air carriers in these abductions can be expected
to arise more frequently. As the verdicts of $15 million and $27
million in the two cases to reach verdict against the carrier evi-
dence, airline exposure for these claims is substantial. Because
of the high stakes and sympathy for the plaintiffs, carriers do not
want to rely on the application of state tort law to the facts of a
particular case. Accordingly, it is essential that carriers vigor-
ously pursue all available defenses, especially the defense of pre-
emption under the ADA or the Warsaw/Montreal Convention.
While the results to date have been mixed, the law is on the side
of the carriers.
ation of the aircraft (i.e., that airline personnel played some causal role in the
commission of the tort), and that because the airline had no causal role in the
abduction, there was no accident. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 156, at
60-61. Although EgyptAir correctly sets forth the standard for finding an "acci-
dent" in the First Circuit, this is not a standard applied by all courts. In fact, I had
the misfortune of arguing in favor of this definition of "accident" on a motion for
summary judgment before the district court judge responsible for one of the
most well-known decisions adopting the definition, only to have him say in the
middle of the argument that he wished he had not written that opinion, and that
he "would come out the other way" if he had it to do over again. Needless to say,
we settled (on favorable terms of course) before any written decision was issued. I
leave a complete analysis of the "accident" issue to another author on another
day.
2014] 289
BAODS
04tAS, it
